Just as in previous cycles of negotiations
between the P5 + 1 (Security Council permanent members U.S., Russia,
China, Great Britain, and France, plus Germany) and Iran, the parties
are butting up against another deadline. It’s November 24 this time
around, and many issues remain.

Should the parties not reach an agreement, it is all but certain that
the talks will be extended for another six- or twelve-month period
rather than break down. Just as with the 21-year “peace process” between
I compliance with the agreement they have signed?

The short answers, of course: no, no, no, no, no, no. In fact, the
existing interim agreement and the negotiations to date involve a
collection of concessions to Iran which make the questions largely
irrelevant.

In October, veteran U.S. diplomat and former Senior Director for the
Central Region at the National Security Council Dennis Ross elaborated
on those concessions:

[The P5+1 negotiators already agreed] to allow
Iran to avoid suspending uranium enrichment, despite UN Security Council
resolutions mandating it do so; accepting that Iran should be treated
like any other NPT signatory after the full implementation of the
comprehensive agreement despite its past transgressions; acquiescing to
Iran’s insistence that it not acknowledge that it pursued a nuclear
weapons program; not including the Iranian ballistic missile program in
the proposed comprehensive agreement; accepting Iranian arguments
against converting its Arak facility to a light water reactor and
shutting down the Fordow facility; and accommodating the Iranian
insistence on not dismantling centrifuges (instead, they would perhaps
reduce output, disconnect the pipes, and be flexible on how many
centrifuges might ultimately still operate).

In short, the U.S. goal appears to be to “freeze” the Iranian
activities at today’s level. They are not looking for any
“dismantlement” or “rolling back.”

Exactly how the pro-Israel community responds to a deal they don’t
like is not entirely clear, especially regarding when it occurs. When
Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey and Illinois Senator Mark Kirk
attempted to pass new sanctions legislation a year ago that would kick
in if Iran broke any nuclear agreement, Obama — through his loyal lackey
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid — applied so much pressure on
Democratic senators that the effort was stalled at 59 votes, one short
of breaking a filibuster. That effort is worth remembering the next time
anyone tries to defend Reid’s alleged pro-Israel credentials, which
disappeared under White House pressure.

Kirk and Menendez are likely to try again, and in the next Senate
they will have a far more receptive group, with 53 or 54 Republicans.
Given the president’s unique ability to diminish the size of the
Democrats’ congressional delegation (since he took office, House
Democrats lost 71 seats, and probably 14 Democratic senators with Mary
Landrieu losing), the Kirk-Menendez effort may not only get to 60, but
possibly to a veto proof two-thirds in both the Senate and House. They
could pull back some of the existing waivers to sanctions that provide
the president great discretion on sanctions relief.

In addition to the Kirk-Menendez sanctions legislation, there may be
an attempt to force a consideration of any agreement as a treaty,
requiring a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The president has already
made clear that he will not bring this nuclear agreement to the Senate,
bypassing Congress as irrelevant once again (Obamacare changes,
immigration changes, etc.).

The president is not without his backers. When it comes to the
Iranian nuclear deal, there are pro-Iran groups that have been active
for years, plus Obama’s Jewish blocking back — J Street — which adopts
every Obama initiative with regard to Israel as its own (especially
pressuring Israel on the Palestinian track ^[3]). J
Street is pushing against any opposition to the deal (without even
knowing its final terms), and against any new sanctions fallback if Iran
fails to comply.

J Street argues that new sanctions, even discussion of new sanctions,
would send the wrong signal and possibly kill the deal, giving Iran an
excuse to withdraw from talks. The Iranians, of course, are free to
label their negotiating partners as the Great Satan and to call for the
destruction of Israel, which they actively support in deeds as well as
words with their backing of Hamas and Hezbollah, among other terrorist
groups. But according to J Street, we need to be conscious of delicate
 Iranian sensitivities at this time.

Secretary of State John Kerry was unusually harsh in his criticism of
Palestinian Authority incitement after the Jerusalem synagogue attack.
Whether that new attitude will carry over to the nuclear negotiations
remains to be seen, though I doubt it will. Failure on that front is not
an option. At worst, it must be deferred for another six or twelve
months.